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COMMENTS
KENTUCKY v. WHORTON AND THE
PRESUMPTION-OF-INNOCENCE INSTRUCTION:
AN IMPRECISE FORMULA FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Although the presumption of the defendant's innocence in
criminal trials' is not expressly required by the United States
Constitution, it has long been accepted as a fundamental prin-
ciple of criminal law.2 Acknowledging this principle, the federal
courts3 and many state courts' hold that it is error to refuse a
proper instruction on the presumption of innocence. Until re-
cently, however, Kentucky courts have held that the accused
I "[T]he accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty." S. GARD, JONES
ON EVIDENCE § 3.11 (6th ed. 1972).
2 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). The following anecdote quoted in
Coffin indicates that the presumption of innocence was a part of the early Roman law.
Numerius, the governor of Narkonensis, was on trial before the Emperor,
and, contrary to the usage in criminal cases, the trial was public. Numerius
contented himself with denying his guilt, and there was not sufficient proof
against him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate man," seeing that the
failure of the accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself, and
exclaimed, "Oh, illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter
will become of the guilty?" to which Julian replied, "If it suffices to accuse,
what will become of the innocent?"
Id. at 455 (quoting Rerum Gestarum, lib. XVIii, c.1).
"Injuria non praesumintur" (a wrong is not presumed) and "odiosa non praesu-
munter" (odious things are not presumed) were two common law adages in criminal
trials. S. GARD, JONES ON EVmFECE § 3.11 (6th ed. 1972).
3 E.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); United States v. Thaxton, 483
F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1973); Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.
1956); McAffee v. United States, 105 F.2d 21, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Miklencic v. United
States, 62 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1933).
E.g., Taylor v. State, 272 So.2d 905 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973); Houston v. State, 5
So. 48 (Fla. 1888); Ealey v. State, 232 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); People v.
Donald, 315 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Farley v. State, 26 N.E. 898 (Ind. 1891);
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 139 N.E. 436, 440 (Mass. 1923); People v. McClintic, 160
N.W. 461, 465 (Mich. 1916); State v. Sailor, 153 N.W. 271 (Minn. 1915); Gilleylen v.
State, 255 So.2d 661, 664 (Miss. 1971); People v. Leavitt, 92 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y.
1950); Roberts v. State, 239 S.W. 960,961 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922); Whaley v. Common-
wealth, 200 S.E.2d 556 (Va. 1973); State v. McHenry, 558 P.2d 188 (Wash. 1977).
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is not entitled to a presumption-of-innocence instruction5 as
long as the trial court instructs the jury that the defendant's
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Accordingly,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held in Taylor v.
Commonwealth7 that it was not error to refuse the accused's
tendered presumption-of-innocence instruction. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision in Taylor v.
Kentuckyg and held that "on the facts of this case the trial
court's refusal to give petitioner's requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence9 resulted in a violation of his right to
a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
0
Subsequently, the case of Whorton v. Commonwealth"
presented anew to the Supreme Court of Kentucky the instruc-
tion issue. In Whorton, the Kentucky Supreme Court inter-
preted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Taylor
"to mean that when an instruction on the presumption of inno-
cence is asked for and denied there is reversible error.' 12 The
Kentucky Court's interpretation of Taylor in effect created a
I Kentucky courts have denied the instruction on the theory that including pre-
sumptions in the jury instructions disturbs the jury's exclusive responsibility to weigh
the evidence and determine guilt or innocence. Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570
S.W.2d 627, 632 (Ky. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 786 (1979). Pursuant to this policy, Ken-
tucky has favored extremely simple jury instructions that avoid "abstract legal princi-
ples, presumptions, and comments on the weight of the evidence." Id. Accord, Cox v.
Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Ky. 1974) (instructions ought to provide "only the bare
bones"); Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974).
1 Swango v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. 1942); Baker v. Common-
wealth, 134 S.W.2d 997 (Ky. 1939); Mink v. Commonwealth, 15 S.W.2d 463 (Ky.
1929); Brown v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W. 777 (Ky. 1923); Cane v. Commonwealth,
556 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
7 551 S.W.2d 813 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
8 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
1 Petitioner requested the following instruction:
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime. Thus a defendant,
although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate." That is with no
evidence against him. The law permits nothing but legal evidence presented
before a jury to be considered in support of any charge against the accused.
So the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant,
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
Id. at 480 n.5.
, Id. at 490.
" 570 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
,2 570 S.W.2d at 633.
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constitutional right to a requested presumption-of-innocence
instruction; the Court held that the constitutional right was
not subject to the harmless-error rule, but rather mandated
automatic reversal in face of an error. 3 Subsequent to the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's decision in Whorton, Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.56 was amended to require the
presumption-of-innocence instruction in every criminal trial. 4
The Commonwealth of Kentucky petitioned and was
granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 5 to con-
sider whether in deciding Whorton v. Commonwealth the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky misinterpreted Taylor. The Com-
monwealth argued that Taylor did not establish a constitu-
tional right but, instead, was limited to its extraordinary
facts.' 6 Alternatively, the Commonwealth argued that even if
Taylor created a constitutionally-mandated requirement, the
harmless-error rule should be applied."
In Kentucky v. Whorton, ," the focus of this comment, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky and remanded the case, holding
that the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor did not create a
constitutional right to the presumption-of-innocence instruc-
tion. The Court emphasized that the cumulative effect of errors
in Taylor was critical to the decision in that case, and held that
failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of
innocence "must be evaluated in light of the totality of the
circumstances . . .to determine whether the defendant re-
ceived a constitutionally fair trial.""
To establish a working background for an analysis and
understanding of the Whorton decision, it is imperative to dis-
tinguish initially between the presumption-of-innocence in-
struction and other constitutional protections afforded the
criminal defendant. 0 Secondly, it is necessary to emphasize
1Id.
" Ky. R. Culm. P. 9.56 (amended 1978) [hereinafter cited as RCr].
,5 Kentucky v. Whorton, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979).
, Brief for Plaintiff at 10, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
7 Id. at 16.
441 U.S. 786 (1979).
', Id. at 786.
See text accompanying notes 24-44 infra for this discussion.
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the factual differences in the Taylor and Whorton trials."1 In
light of this background, analysis of the Whorton decision will
indicate that the United States Supreme Court has imposed an
imprecise formula on appellate courts.22 Essentially, the
Court's decision in Whorton changes the focus of appellate
review from an inquiry into whether the trial court gave a
presumption-of-innocence instruction to a determination of
whether the defendant received a fair trial considering all of the
circumstances. The Whorton opinion offers reviewing courts
little guidance in determining when the cumulative effect of
errors by the trial court results in an "unfair" trial; similarly,
the decision fails to delineate the role of the presumption-of-
innocence instruction in both "curing" errors and overcoming
the cumulative effect of those errors. Finally, it is important to
consider the effect that the Whorton decision will have on Ken-
tucky law in light of the amended RCr 9.56.2
I. A WORKING BACKGROUND
A. The Presumption-of-Innocence Instruction Vis-&z-Vis
Established Constitutional Rights
1. The Purpose of the Presumption of Innocence
The principle that the accused is innocent until proven
guilty is actually not a presumption; rather it is a fundamental
assumption 24 of criminal law.? This assumption serves two pur-
poses in a criminal trial: it assigns the burden of proof to the
prosecution, and it warns the jury that only legal evidence is
21 See text accompanying notes 45-62 infra for this discussion.
22 See text accompanying notes 63-69 infra for this analysis.
2 See text accompanying notes 70-86 infra for this discussion.
2, The "presumption" of innocence is a misnomer. It is really an "assumption"
because it is assumed that a man's actions are lawful until there is sufficient proof to
counter that assumption. McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvmENcE § 342 (2d
ed. 1972). A true presumption consists of a basic fact which supports a finding of an
inferred fact. A typical presumption is the mailed-received pattern. For example, if
facts indicate that a letter was properly addressed and mailed, it is inferred that the
addressee received it. G. LiuLY, AN INTRODUCrION To THE LAW Or EVIDENcE § 16 (1978).
2 "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
[Vol. 68
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relevant to the verdict."
While the early position that the presumption-of-
innocence instruction is evidence in favor of the accused has
been repudiated,2 scholars and courts still uphold the distinc-
tion made in Coffin v. United States2 between the reasonable
doubt instruction0 and the presumption-of-innocence instruc-
tion.3' In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that
an instruction on reasonable doubt did not obviate the need for
a presumption-of-innocence instruction in view of the "special
purpose" for the latter.32 The presumption-of-innocence in-
struction assigns the burden of proof and admonishes the jury,
while the reasonable doubt instruction specifies the requisite
quantity of proof.3 Thus, the presumption-of-innocence in-
struction serves a separate, viable function.
2. The Presumption-of-Innocence Instruction:
L A Constitutional Right?
Although Kentucky clearly accepts and applies the
presumption-of-innocence principle in criminal trials,34 jury
instruction on the presumption of innocence had been pro-
scribed prior to Taylor as part of the philosophy that jury in-
structions should not be encumbered by presumptions or refer-
ences to the burden of proof.35 While the federal courts tender
26 See 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2511 (1940 & Supp. 1979).
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51 (1897).
29 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
3 The accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
36 Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286 (1895); Coffin v. United States 156 U.S.
432 (1895); People v. Long, 95 N.E.2d 461 (111. 1950); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 551
S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (Wilhoit, J., dissenting), rev'd, 436 U.S. 478
(1978). See S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 3.11 (6th ed. 1972).
12 436 U.S. at 488.
" See S. GARD, JONES ON EviDENCE § 3.11 (6th ed. 1972).
14 "The notion that a man is presumed innocent until proven guilty is every bit
as firmly embedded in the criminal law of Kentucky as in its federal counterpart
.... " Whorton v. Commonwealth 570 S.W.2d 627, 636 (Ky. 1978) (Clayton, J.,
dissenting), rev'd 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
1 See Mason v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1978) (presumption of
sanity to be deleted from future instructions); Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.
420, 423 (Ky. 1926) (reference to presumption of innocence was properly refused as
argumentative); trown v. Commonwealth, 249 S.W. 777, 778 (Ky. 1923) (while an
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the presumption-of-innocence instruction,36 the question of
constitutional right to the instruction allegedly was not decided
prior to the Taylor and Whorton cases.37 Although the pre-
sumption in a criminal trial that the accused is innocent until
proven guilty is a fundamental tenet of our criminal law,3" the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Whorton indicates
that failure to give the presumption-of-innocence instruction
does not alone abridge the constitutional rights of a criminal
defendant."
The Supreme Court's decision in Whorton is based in part
upon the distinction between those errors that substantially
affect the defendant's constitutional rights and thus require
reversal and other errors, like the omission of the presumption-
of-innocence instruction, that do not require automatic rever-
sal. Errors which substantially affect the constitutional rights
of the defendant are those which are obviously prejudicial 0 or
instruction on the presumption of innocence "fairly presents the law," it is more
favorable to the defendant than that to which he is entitled). See note 5 supra for an
explanation of the theory underlying Kentucky's historic refusal to allow any reference
to the presumption of innocence in jury instructions. However, Ky. R. CPa,. P. 9.56
was amended subsequent to Taylor to require the presumption-of-innocence instruc-
tion "in every case."
11 See note 3 supra for citation to federal courts upholding the presumption-of-
innocence instruction.
11 Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (state court's refusal to give pre-
sumption-of-innocence instruction held not to be denial of due process), was distin-
guished in Taylor, 436 U.S. at 489. The Court stated that the briefs for the appellants
in Howard argued that the accused was entitled to an instruction that the presumption
of innocence was "evidence" to be considered in their favor. The Supreme Court had
repudiated the concept in Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897). The Court in
Taylor stated that "Howard held only that the accused is not entitled to an instruction
that the presumption of innocence is 'evidence'." 436 U.S. at 490.
Curiously, the Howard opinion makes no reference to the alleged specificity of the
requested instruction or to the appellant's brief. Rather, the Court stated that in the
face of state law, "the omission in a state trial of any reference to the presumption of
innocence cannot be regarded as a denial of due process of law." 191 U.S. at 137. Thus,
it would appear that the Taylor and Whorton cases have clarified former precedent.
8 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
' 441 U.S. at 789.
40 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial in state criminal
case); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (district attorney knowingly used perjured
testimony); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78 (1935) (prosecutor's use of improper assertions and insinuations).
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discredit the reliability of the verdict.4' Miranda42 violations or
search and seizure violations are likely to taint the entire trial
process, and thereby disturb the reliability of the verdict. In
contrast, omission of the presumption-of-innocence instruction
does not affect the entire trial process. The instruction serves
a cautionary or, at best, remedial function by allocating the
burden of proof and admonishing the jury to consider only legal
evidence in reaching the verdict.43 While the instruction is es-
pecially important to a fair trial if the evidence conflicts," it
serves a questionable function when the evidence is over-
whelmingly against the defendant.
B. A Comparison of the Facts of Taylor and Whorton
In Whorton v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held that the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Taylor established a constitutional right that was not
subject to the Chapman-Harrington5 harmless-error rule. 7
11 The effect of an error which discredits the reliability of a fair and just verdict
cannot be isolated; the error has influenced the entire trial process. For example, if
the judge has a pecuniary interest in the verdict, there is no way to know whether his
biases affected discretionary decisions. Note, Harmless Constitutional Error-A
Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. REV. 814 (1970). See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" See 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2511 (1940 & Supp. 1979).
People v. Long, 95 N.E.2d 461, 463 (Ill. 1950).
15 570 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
46 The Chapman-Harrington test is the federal harmless-error rule and is applica-
ble to constitutional errors. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), established the
principle that "there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal
of the conviction." Id. at 22. The Court stated that the test of whether a constitutional
error could be held harmless required the reviewing court to find the error "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. This federal standard was modified two years
later in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), wherein the Court stated that
the effect of the error must be analyzed vis-a-vis the other evidence in the case. Under
the Chapman-Harrington test, if the legal evidence is independently overwhelming
against the defendant, some constitutional errors are harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, some constitutional rights are "so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
at 23. The Court in Chapman indicated that perhaps Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (lack of counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confes-
sion); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge with pecuniary interest in
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Even though the evidence in Whorton was overwhelmingly
against the defendant, the Kentucky Court insisted that the
defendant's right to the presumption-of-innocence instruction
was absolute and not to be measured in light of the circumstan-
ces of each case." The Court would have avoided being reversed
in Kentucky v. Whorton49 had it distinguished Whorton from
Taylor by focusing on the extraordinary need for the
presumption-of-innocence instruction in the Taylor trial in
order to negate the effect of other prejudicial factors.
Analysis of the facts surrounding the Taylor trial reveals
several prejudicial errors and generally scant evidence against
the defendant. The Taylor trial was unusual because several
damaging circumstances, although not independently reversi-
ble errors, in the aggregate violated due process absent an in-
struction on the presumption of innocence. In Taylor the
United States Supreme Court outlined four factors that were
detrimental to a fair trial in that case: 1) the alleged "skeletal
[jury] instructions,""0 2) the prosecutor's incriminating refer-
ences to the indictment," 3) improper comments in the prose-
cutor's closing argument, 2 and 4) the virtual "swearing contest
between victim and accused. 5 .3
outcome of case), typify a kind of constitutional violation that pervades the entire trial,
thereby rendering an unfair trial. A violation that influences the whole trial process
and disturbs the reliability of adjudication cannot be isolated to allow application of
the overwhelming evidence test promulgated in Harrington. Therefore, these errors are
subject to automatic reversal. See generally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error:
The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1969); Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error-A Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. REV. 814 (1970); Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967).
'7 570 S.W.2d at 633.
" Id. at 632. The majority stated that while they would like to hold that the Taylor
requirement was subject to the harmless-error rule, they were afraid that "it might not
stick." Id. at 633.
4" 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
10 The jury was instructed on the specific elements of the crime and on reasonable
doubt. 436 U.S. at 481 n.7.
" The prosecutor read the indictment in his opening statement, implying guilt
from the fact of the indictment. An instruction that the indictment is not evidence was
denied. 436 U.S. at 481.
"2 The prosecutor declared that the defendant, "like every other defendant who's
ever been tried" and convicted, had the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
This statement equated the defendant with every guilty defendant by implying that
his status as a defendant was evidence of his guilt. Id. at 486-87.
" The robbery victim was the prosecution's only witness and the petitioner was
[Vol. 68
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The latter three of these factors bear directly on the ac-
cused's guilt or innocence. A presumption-of-innocence in-
struction was important to counter the damaging implications
made by the prosecutor and to allocate expressly the burden
of proof in the "swearing contest." Undoubtedly, the four fac-
tors were influential in the Supreme Court's holding; absent
the cumulative effect of these factors, it is unlikely that the
Court would have reversed the Taylor conviction.
Further indication that the Supreme Court was impressed
by the cumulative effect of the errors and not solely by the
omitted presumption-of-innocence instruction is found from a
close analysis of the language in the opinion. The Court held
that "on the facts of this case"54 failure to give the requested
presumption-of-innocence instruction resulted in a violation of
due process of law. Similarly, the Court referred to a
"particular need for such an instruction in this case, 5 5 due to
the "cumulative effect of the potentially damaging circumstan-
ces of this case."56 The language indicates that the United
States Supreme Court did not contemplate a per se rule in the
Taylor decision.
Analysis of the facts in the Whorton case reveals that the
evidence was much stronger against the defendant, Harold
Whorton, than it was against the accused in Taylor.57 Although
as the trial began the indictment was read into the record
without an accompanying instruction that it was not evidence
of the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor did not imply the defen-
dant's guilt from the fact of the indictment. 8 The prosecution
subsequently produced fifteen eyewitnesses who testified
against Whorton.5' Whorton did not testify on his own behalf,
but his wife and sister-in-law offered alibi testimony." No fur-
ther evidence was produced by the defense.'
As in Taylor, the trial court refused a properly-tendered
the only witness for the defense. Id. at 488.
"Id. at 490.
5 Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 487 n.15 (emphasis added).
7 570 S.W.2d at 632.
6' Id. at 637 (Clayton, J., dissenting).
6' Id.
" Id. at 629.
I !d.
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instruction on the presumption of innocence. 2 However, unlike
the facts in Taylor there was no "swearing contest" and the
presumption-of-innocence instruction was not required to ne-
gate the prosecutor's implications. Nonetheless, in Whorton
the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the defendant's con-
viction, holding that Taylor created an across-the-board con-
stitutional right to the presumption-of-innocence instruction.
II. WHAT DOES Kentucky v. Whorton MEAN?
The United States Supreme Court held in Kentucky v.
Whorton 3 that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not require the presumption-of-innocence instruc-
tion in every case, and that the Court's decision in Taylor
simply meant that failure to give the presumption-of-
innocence instruction must be evaluated under all of the cir-
cumstances of the trial, including other restrictions, the weight
of the evidence, arguments of counsel and other relevant ele-
ments. If, as in Taylor, the facts of the case cumulatively pre-
sent the risk that failure to give the instruction deprived the
defendant of a fair trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial
under due process of law. Thus, the Court did not establish a
new constitutional rule of law, but only reaffirmed the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
However, Whorton leaves appellate courts with some un-
answered questions. The decision fails to clarify the impor-
tance of the relationship and interaction of the instruction with
other trial errors. Indeed, Whorton may be read to mean that
the presumption-of-innocence instruction can "cure" other er-
rors. The Court focused on the cumulative effect of the type
and number of prejudicial factors that occurred in the Taylor
trial 4 and implied that had the presumption-of-innocence in-
struction been given, the defendant would have received a fair
trial. It is difficult to comprehend how the presence of the
presumption-of-innocence instruction counteracts the cumula-
62 The tendered instruction was similar to the one tendered in Taylor. Id. at 630.
See note 9 supra for the text of the instruction.
63 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
64 Id. at 788-89. See notes 50-53 supra for a discussion of the prejudicial factors in
the Taylor trial.
[Vol. 68
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tive effect of other prejudicial trial circumstances. As in
Taylor, some trial errors and prejudicial factors, although not
independent constitutional errors, cumulatively cause consti-
tutional error under the totality of the circumstances.65 Addi-
tionally, some constitutional errors are subject to the
Chapman-Harrington harmless-error test, which essentially
evaluates the error in light of the totality of the circumstan-
ces.6" If appellate review concentrates on the total circumstan-
ces of a trial, the presence or absence of a single instruction
should not decisively tip the scales of fairness under due pro-
cess of law.
The Whorton decision also may be read to imply that the
presumption-of-innocence instruction can only be used to
"cure" certain kinds of errors; if this is so, the key analysis
involves the character and number of the errors at the trial
level. The Taylor opinion referred to the "purging effect" of the
presumption-of-innocence instruction as one way to protect the
accused's constitutional right to be judged only on legal evi-
dence admitted at trial." In Taylor, the instruction was desira-
ble to counter the prosecutor's incriminating statements and
the trial court's refusal to instruct that the indictment was not
evidence of the accused's guilt. Additionally, the instruction
was important to allocate the burden of proof in the "swearing
contest" between the victim and the accused. Under this ap-
proach the presumption-of-innocence instruction plays a credi-
ble role as a "cure" only when other circumstances of a trial
threaten the presumption of innocence" guaranteed a defen-
dant. The presumption was directly challenged by the circum-
stances occurring in Taylor, and therefore the instruction may
have served a viable function. However, if the errors or circum-
436 U.S. at 487 n.15. Although each of several prejudicial factors considered in
isolation may be disregarded as harmless, these factors when considered in the aggre-
gate are sometimes so prejudicial to a fair trial- that they jointly become reversible
error. See also Delzell v. Day, 223 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1950); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d
588 (Mo. 1959); In re Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (N.Y. 1924).
11 See note 46 supra for a detailed discussion of the Chapman-Harrington federal
harmless-error rule.
11 436 U.S. at 486. See United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir.
1973).
11 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432 (1895).
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stances in the Taylor trial had been unrelated to the presump-
tion of innocence, the instruction's ability to "cure" would
have been far more tenuous.
In Taylor, the cumulative effect of prejudicial factors
heightened the Supreme Court's concern that the defendant
did not receive a fair trial. 9 Dissimilarly, the Whorton trial was
not plagued by prejudicial factors and the evidence was over-
whelmingly against the accused. Considering the cumulative
effect of all of the trial circumstances, the Whorton and Taylor
trials are at opposite ends of a "fairness" scale. The Whorton
decision leaves open the question of whether the urgency for the
presumption-of-innocence instruction increases in reverse pro-
portion to the trial's "fairness" or whether it relates to the
ability of the instruction to "cure" particular types of errors.
Furthermore, Whorton does little to define the role of the
presumption-of-innocence instruction vis-&-vis other trial cir-
cumstances. Instead, it is clear that the defendant is entitled
to the instruction only when some unspecific factors threaten
the defendant's constitutional right to the nebulous concept of
a "fair trial." Appellate courts are now faced with totalling
numberless factors to determine whether the accused received
a fair trial without the presumption-of-innocence instruction.
II. Kentucky v. Whorton: THE EFcT ON KENTUCKY LAW
After the United States Supreme Court decided Taylor v.
Kentucky, 0 RCr 9.561 was amended to require the
presumption-of-innocence instruction in every criminal case.
In order to analyze the effect of the Whorton decision on Ken-
tucky law it is imperative to distinguish those cases involving
convictions obtained prior to the rule amendment and those
cases involving convictions obtained after the change."
In cases where convictions were obtained before the
amended RCr 9.56 was effective, appellate review is bound by
" See notes 50-53 supra for a discussion of the cumulative effect of errors in the
Taylor trial.
70 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
"' Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.56 (amended June 8, 1978, effective July 1, 1978). The rule
states: "(1) In every case the jury shall be instructed substantially as follows: 'The law
presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime . ... '
72 The amendment was effective as of July 1, 1978. Id.
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the holding in Kentucky v. Whorton.73 Under Whorton, the
reviewing court must study all elements of the defendant's trial
to determine whether failure to give the presumption-of-
innocence instruction deprived the accused of a fair trial.4 If
the court finds that under the totality of the circumstances
omission of the instruction deprived the accused of a fair trial,
the conviction must be reversed. If the evidence is overwhelm-
ingly against the defendant and the trial is not tainted by other
errors, failure to give the presumption-of-innocence instruction
will not alone deprive the accused of a fair trial.7 5
Clearly, states may supplement or broaden the protec-
tions that the Constitution provides."6 Accordingly, state courts
may require the presumption-of-innocence instruction as a
matter of state law in spite of Whorton.7 Therefore, appellate
review of convictions obtained after the amendment of RCr
9.56 involves a different analysis. The rule states, in relevant
part, that in every case the jury must be instructed that the law
presumes the defendant is innocent. ' However, the amended
rule does not preclude inadvertent error. It is not clear what
role Kentucky v. Whorton7 will play in the event that error
under the amended rule results from failure to give the
presumption-of-innocence instruction.
Essentially, the rule was amended because the Supreme
Court of Kentucky misinterpreted Taylor."0 Now that
Kentucky v. Whorton has clarified Taylor, the portion of RCr
9.56 that requires the presumption-of-innocence instruction
73 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
74 Id.
71 Similarly, the Court in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973), stated that an
instruction cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed against the entire
trial. Accord, Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926).
,1 E.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Cooper v. Cal., 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). See also Howard, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
T1 See note 4 supra for citation to states that require the presumption-of-innocence
instruction.
,1 See note 71 supra for the relevant portion of the rule.
79 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
11 In the past, Kentucky has proscribed presumptions generally, and the
presumption-of-innocence instruction, specifically, as part of jury instructions. See
notes 5 and 35 supra for more discussion. However, within one week after the Taylor
decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky amended Ky. R. Cnm. P. 9.56 to require the
presumption-of-innocence instruction.
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may be repealed. If the presumption-of-innocence instruction
is retained as part of state criminal procedure, appellate courts
may choose to apply the state harmless-error provision8' to re-
sultant errors or may elect to automatically reverse all errors.
The state harmless-error provision mandates that all er-
rors not affecting "substantial rights" shall be disregarded. 2
Although it is clear from Whorton that omission of the
presumption-of-innocence instruction does not alone abridge
constitutional rights, the omitted instruction can contribute to
constitutional error 3 Therefore, if a court applies the state
harmless-error provision to errors involving the presumption-
of-innocence instruction, the court's inquiry must be directed
to both the accused's substantial rights under state law and to
the accused's constitutional rights under federal law.
As was the case in Taylor, if other errors taint the trial or
if the evidence against the defendant is weak, the accused's
constitutional rights may be affected by a failure to instruct on
the presumption of innocence. The Whorton decision makes it
clear that the failure to give the presumption-of-innocence in-
struction must be evaluated vis-a-vis the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether the defendant received a fair
trial. If the reviewing court determines after considering all of
the circumstances that the accused's rights have been violated,
federal constitutional law intercedes and demands reversal of
the conviction. Thus, if the Kentucky courts chose to apply the
state harmless-error provision to the failure to give the
presumption-of-innocence instruction, they must necessarily
refer to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Whorton to determine whether or not the error was in fact
"harmless"; in such cases, the Whorton decision will continue
to influence Kentucky law.
While it is hazardous to predict the path that any court
will follow, if the amended RCr 9.56 remains in effect, it is
likely that the Supreme Court of Kentucky will reverse all
convictions appealed on grounds that the trial court failed to
instruct on the presumption of innocence. The rule is unambig-
S, Ky. R. Cram. P. 9.24.
82 Id. The rule reads: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
13 See note 65 supra for a discussion of cumulative prejudice of errors.
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uous and mandates that the instruction be given in every crim-
inal case."4 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky dem-
onstrated in Whorton v. Commonwealth and subsequent
cases" a rigid unwillingness to subject the then misconstrued
constitutional error to the Chap man-Harrington federal
harmless-error rule.8" For these reasons, the Court probably will
reject application of the harmless-error doctrine to errors of
RCr 9.56 and will automatically reverse all such errors.
In summary, the impact that Kentucky v. Whorton will
have on Kentucky courts is yet to be seen. Whorton will control
and guide appellate review of all convictions obtained before
RCr 9.56 was amended. Additionally, Whorton subsequently
will control appellate review if the rule amendment is repealed.
If the rule is retained as it presently exists, Whorton will influ-
ence appellate courts reviewing convictions obtained after the
rule amendment only if the appellate courts apply the state
harmless-error rule. Finally, if the courts elect to automatically
reverse all judgments where the trial court fails to instruct on
the presumption of innocence, the protections of Kentucky law
will supersede those established in Whorton. In light of the
likelihood that the Kentucky courts will read RCr 9.56 to re-
quire automatic reversal if the presumption-of-innocence in-
struction is denied, the Whorton decision should have a rather
negligible impact on Kentucky law.
CONCLUSION
In Kentucky v. Whorton, the United States Supreme
Court firmly established that the due process clause of the
11 Ky. R. Crum. P. 9.56.
85 Watson v. Commonwealth, No. 78-SC-300-MR (Ky. Feb. 27, 1979); Avery v.
Commonwealth, No. 78-SC-75-MR (Ky. July 25, 1978); Williams v. Commonwealth,
No. 78-SC-68-MR (Ky. July 25, 1978).
" In Whorton, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was reluctant to apply the
Chapman-Harrington harmless-error rule for fear of reversal by the United States
Supreme Court. 570 S.W.2d at 633. Curiously, Watson v. Commonwealth, No. 78-SC-
300-MR (Ky. Feb. 27, 1979), subsequently held that the Court in Whorton had elected
"as a matter of state law" not to apply the Chapman-Harrington rule to the then
misconceived constitutional right.
At this point it is unclear whether the Supreme Court of Kentucky will apply the
harmless-error rule to errors involving the failure to give the presumption-of-innocence
instruction. However, the Watson holding is now clearly meaningless since it was based
on false underpinnings.
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fourteenth amendment does not entitle every defendant to the
presumption-of-innocence instruction. The instruction is
merely a single element of the entire trial process that must be
evaluated to determine whether the accused received a fair
trial. The Court gave little guidance to appellate courts faced
with the task of determining when the instruction is crucial and
when it is immaterial. Indeed, for many appellate courts the
future is likely to be fraught with frustration. Kentucky courts,
however, might escape direct confrontation with the problems
inherent in the Whorton precedent. If the legislature retains
RCr 9.56 as amended, and if the courts subject errors under the
rule to automatic reversal, the protections of state law will
supersede the constitutional law implicit in Whorton.
Anne Abbott Trumpf
